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Abstract
The spread of an infection on a real-world social network is determined by the interplay of two
processes – the dynamics of the network, whose structure changes over time according to the encounters
between individuals, and the dynamics on the network, whose nodes can infect each other after an
encounter. Physical encounter is the most common vehicle for the spread of infectious diseases, but
detailed information about said encounters is often unavailable because expensive, unpractical to collect
or privacy sensitive. The present work asks whether the friendship ties between the individuals in a
social network successfully predict who is at risk. Using a dataset from a popular online review service,
we build a time-varying network that is a proxy of physical encounter between users and a static network
based on their reported friendship. Through computer simulations, we compare infection processes on the
resulting networks and show that, whereas distance on the friendship network is correlated to epidemic
risk, friendship provides a poor identification of the individuals at risk if the infection is driven by
physical encounter. Our analyses suggest that such limit is not due to the randomness of the infection
process, but to the structural differences of the two networks. In addition, we argue that our results are
not driven by the static nature of the friendship network as opposed to the time-varying nature of the
encounter network, as a static version of the encounter network provides more accurate prediction of
risk than the friendship network. In contrast to the macroscopic similarity between processes spreading
on different networks – confirmed by our simulations, the differences in local connectivity determined
by the two definitions of edges result in striking differences between the dynamics at a microscopic
level, preventing the identification of the nodes at risk. Despite the limits highlighted by our analyses,
we show that periodical and relatively infrequent monitoring of the real infection on the encounter
network allows to correct the predicted infection on the friendship network and to achieve satisfactory
prediction accuracy. In addition, the friendship network contains valuable information to effectively
contain epidemic outbreaks when a limited budget is available for immunization.
LC and IR: MIT Media Lab. MGH: UNICEF Innovation Unit. MF: University of California San Diego. Email:
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I. Introduction
The forecast and mitigation of epidemics is a central theme in public health [22], [30], [31],
[32], [39], [47], [61], and events such as the recent ebola epidemic constantly drive the attention
and resources of governments, institutions such as the World Health Organization, and the
research community [36], [40], [56], [60], [63], [76]. The study of infectious processes on
real-world networks is of interests to diverse disciplines, and similar models have been proposed
to characterize the spread of information, behaviors, cultural norms, innovation, as well as the
diffusion of computer viruses [35], [59], [74], [77], [89]. Therefore, epidemiologists, computer
scientists and social scientist have joint forces in the study of contagion phenomena. Due to the
impossibility to study the spread of infectious diseases through controlled experiments, modeling
efforts have prevailed [41], [52], [55], [73], [74]. Recently, advancements in computation tools
determined the emergence of data-driven simulations in the study of epidemic outbreaks and
dynamical processes in general [91].
The spread of an infection over a real-world network is determined by the interplay of
two processes: the dynamics of the network, whose edges change over time according to the
encounters between individuals; and the dynamics on the network, whose nodes can infect each
other after they encounter. When the two dynamics operate at comparable time scales, their
interdependence appears particularly relevant, the time-varying nature of the network cannot be
ignored [38], [46], [53], [75], [81] and specifically devised control strategies are necessary [58].
Aggregating the dynamics of the edges into a static version of the network can provide useful
insights [26] but it can introduce bias [44], [75]. Empirical work suggests that the bursty activity
patterns of individuals slow down spreading [51], [85], [90], but temporal correlations seem to
accelerate the early phase of an epidemic [50], [79]
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4Physical encounter is the most common vehicle for the spread of infectious diseases (as in
the case of airborne diseases), and detailed information about said encounters is fundamental for
monitoring and containing outbreaks. Various sources of data can serve as a proxy of physical
encounter – checkins on social networking platforms [17], [68], [69], traffic records [7], [87],
[88], phone call records [37], [43], [70], wifi and RFID wearable sensors data [14], [42], [48],
[71], [80], [85], geographical and non-geographical information shared online [6], [16], surveys
and diaries of daily contact [25], [64], [65], and recently multiplex data [86].
However, pervasive and detailed information is rarely available and might be expensive and
unpractical to collect (as in the case of sensor technologies [14], [80], [85]), prone to errors (as in
the case of survey data [24], [78]), and privacy-sensitive [2], [9], [10], [23], [54], [57], [82], [93].
In general, researchers have to rely on the information in their possession, and in this work we
consider the case of self-reported relationships between individuals, such as friendship between
the users of an online social network. Recent research has shown that communication records
and social ties are useful to explain and predict human dynamics. Location data from cell phone
records and online social networks has shown that social relationships can partially explain the
patterns of human mobility [18]. Contact tracing based on phone communication activity has been
proposed as a proxy of physical interaction in the context of a method to reduce the final size of
epidemic outbreaks [28]. Both real-word social relationships (e.g., family, professional, friendship
ties) and online social relationships (e.g. Facebook friendship, follower-followee relationships on
Twitter) predict the diffusion of behaviors [4], [5], [15], [19], [20]. At a structural level, there is
evidence that networks generated from wearable sensor measurements, diaries of daily contacts,
online links and self-reported friendship present similar structural properties [62], but contacts
recorded by wearable sensors might not be reported in surveys, especially when the contact’s
duration is short [83]. In general, it is not clear whether and within which limits friendship can
be considered a valid proxy of physical encounter, as a process spreading from an initial seed,
or “patient zero”, can reach only the nodes in its set of influence through paths that respect time
ordering [45].
Given an infection transmitted by physical encounter on a social network, the present work
asks whether the friendship ties between the same individuals successfully predict who is at risk.
Using the Yelp Dataset Challenge dataset (www.yelp.com/dataset challenge), we build a time-
varying network that is a proxy of physical encounter between users and a static network based on
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5their reported friendship. We refer to these networks as the encounter network and the friendship
network, respectively. Through computer simulations, we compare the evolution of Susceptible-
Infected (SI) processes [3] on the two networks, in terms of the sets of infected individuals.
Given a seed, is the set of nodes infected on the friendship network a good approximation of
those infected in the encounter network?
Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose similarity measures to quantify how precisely the
set of individuals predicted to be at risk according to a given spreading model (e.g., friendship)
approximates the set of individuals at risk according to a different underlying spreading model
(e.g., physical encounter). Given a target infection size and a seed present in both networks,
we separately simulate infections starting at that seed in both networks and compare the sets
of infected nodes. The proposed measures allows disentangling between the randomness of the
infection process and the effect of the structural differences between the networks. Given this
measure, we show that despite friendship networks produce similar epidemic dynamics at the
macro level, friendship provides a poor identification of the individuals at risk if the infection is
driven by physical encounter. That is, the sets of individuals infected on the friendship network
are in general very different from the corresponding ones on the encounter network. This is true
even after controlling for the fact that certain individuals might be connected in one network
and not in the other. Our analyses suggest that such difference is primarily determined by the
structural differences of the two networks, and due only in part to the randomness of the infection
process. Despite the randomness of the infection increases the unpredictability of the set of
infected individuals (between independent processes initiated at the same seed on the same
network), topological characteristics amplify such unpredictability when considering the two
different networks. In addition, our results are not driven by the static nature of the friendship
network as opposed to the time-varying nature of the encounter network, as a static version of
the encounter network provides more accurate prediction of risk than the friendship network.
Also, similar conclusions hold if we compare the encounter network to a time-varying version
of the friendship network. The limits of the friendship network in predicting epidemic risk are
not simply due to the time ordering of the influence sets determined by physical encounter.
Despite the limits highlighted by our analyses, we show that periodical and relatively infrequent
monitoring of the real infection on the encounter network allows to correct the predicted infection
on the friendship network and to achieve satisfactory prediction accuracy. This corresponds to
DRAFT
6a less extreme scenario in which the researcher has still knowledge of the friendship network,
but, in addition, is able to monitor the infected population (on the encounter network) at given
times. In particular, we compare the sets of infected individuals on the two networks right before
each correction and show that a good level of prediction accuracy is established early in the
process and maintained over time. Our results suggest that the ability to periodically monitor the
infection on the encounter network is the key to overcome the limits of the friendship network
in predicting epidemic risk.
In addition, we show that the friendship network encodes useful information for the con-
tainment of epidemic outbreaks. We consider scenarios in which a fixed budget is available
for immunization (e.g., limited amount of vaccine) and must be effectively allocated in order
to contain the epidemic. In contrast to the simple method of purely random immunization, we
consider a strategy that selects random friends of randomly chosen individuals for immunization,
a method already proposed to predict the peak of an epidemic outbreak [21] and the spread of
information online [33]. This strategy is motivated by the “friendship paradox”, the network
property for which the average friend of an individual is more connected than the average
individual [29], and is simple, only requiring individuals to name a friend. The strategy allows
effective use of the immunization budget, substantially increasing the probability that an infection
dies out in its early stage, and strongly reducing the expected final infection size with respect
to purely random immunization. Moreover, it only requires a small additional cost to obtain the
same effect of an ideal strategy that administers immunization to future encounters rather than
friends.
Since seminal work on the structure and growth of complex networks [8], [27], [92], inter-
disciplinary research has shown that biological networks, social networks and the Internet are
governed by similar rules [1], [11], [49], [66], and share similar structure [34], [67], [72].
In particular, very similar models have been proposed to characterize the spread of epidemics,
information, behaviors, and cultural norms. Despite the macroscopic similarity between pro-
cesses spreading on different networks (confirmed by our simulations), our work shows that the
differences in local connectivity determined by the two definitions of edges result in striking
differences between the dynamics at a microscopic level, which prevent the identification of the
nodes at risk.
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7A. Outline
Section II describes the dataset and introduces the friendship network and the encounter
network, as well as a static version of the encounter network and a time-varying version of the
friendship network that will be considered in the analyses. Section III introduces the epidemic
process, defines the metrics to measure its spread, and describes the sensor selection mechanisms
considered in the analysis of the process at the macro level. Section IV shows that, given an
infection initiated at a single seed and spreading on the encounter network, nodes at shorter
distance from the seed on the friendship network have higher risk of infection. Section V
compares processes initiated at the same seed but spreading separately on the encounter network,
on the friendship network and on a static version of the encounter network, and highlights the
limits of the friendship network in predicting epidemic risk (if the epidemic spreads via physical
encounter). To further support that our results are not driven by the static nature of the friendship
network as opposed to the time-varying nature of the encounter network, Section VI compares
epidemic risk on the encounter network and on the time-varying version of the friendship
network, whereas VII compares epidemic risk on the friendship network and on the static
version of the encounter network. Section VIII considers the situation in which the estimated
set of infected individuals on the friendship network can be periodically corrected to match the
set of infected individuals on the encounter network, and shows that even relatively infrequent
correction overcomes the limits of the friendship networks in predicting epidemic risk. Section IX
considers the problem of effectively containing epidemic outbreaks when a limited budget is
available for immunization, and shows that the friendship network contains valuable information
to effectively allocate this budget. Section X and Section XI provide a characterization of the
epidemics at a macroscopic level. In particular, Section X consider processes spreading on the
encounter network and on the time-varying version of the friendship network, and Section XI
consider processes spreading on the friendship network and on the static version of the encounter
network. We conclude in Section XII.
II. The friendship network and the encounter network
The Yelp Dataset Challenge dataset (www.yelp.com/dataset challenge) consists in 1, 569, 264
reviews and 495, 107 tips to 61, 184 businesses (in 10 cities around the world) posted by
366, 715 users over a period spanning over than 10 years. Within this period, we consider 1, 469
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8consecutive days ranging from 1/1/2011 to 1/8/2015, as reviews before 2011 are less numerous.
Each review and tip includes the user who posted it, the reviewed business, and the date it
was posted. Yelp users can form friendship ties between each other, and the list of friends of
each user is included in the dataset. Time information about the formation of friendship ties is
not available. Using the dataset, we define two networks, called the friendship network and the
encounter network respectively.
Let U be the set of users, F ⊆ U×U be the set of friendship ties, B the set of businesses, T be
the set of days, R ⊆ U ×B×T be the set of reviews and tips (which we will refer to as reviews).
For each user u ∈ U let Fu ⊂ U be the set of friends of u. Therefore F = ∪u∈U{(u, v) : v ∈ Fu}.
Each review (or tip) r ∈ R is a triple (u, b, t) where u ∈ U, b ∈ B, t ∈ T .
A. The friendship network
Of all users, 174, 100 have at least one friend, with an average number of friends per user, or
friend degree, 14.8. The friend degree distribution is shown in Figure 1 (triangles).
Let NF = (U, F) be the static friendship network. As we consider processes spreading between
connected nodes, connectedness is the key property of the networks. Therefore, we restrict our
attention to the giant component, as users outside giant components form small components
whose dynamics are not relevant. The giant component defined by friendship includes 168, 923
users (whereas the second largest component has 8 users). In what follows, we will identify NF
with its giant component. Observe that this network is static, as its edges do not change over
time.
B. The encounter network
The most common vehicle for the spread of infectious diseases is physical contact (rather than
friendship) between individuals. Strictly speaking, two users in U encountered on a given day t
if they visit the same business on day t at the same time. In the present work, we use reviews
as a proxy of physical encounter: an edge is active between two users in U on day t if they
posted a review to the same business on day t. This constitutes an approximation to real physical
encounter, which requires users to visit (rather than review) a business at about the same time.
This approximation is justified as the time of a review is a proxy of the time of the visit to
a business, and the element that spreads over a network (e.g., a virus or an opinion) does not
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9Fig. 1. Inverse Cumulative Distribution Function of friend degree (grey triangles) and encounter degree (white circles). The
friend degree of a user is defined as the her number of friendship ties. The encounter degree of a user is defined as her number
of encounters during all period of observation.
necessarily require direct physical contact. For example, in the case of airborne transmission,
particles can remain suspended in the air for hours after an infected individuals has occupied a
room [12]. In the context of our dataset, after an infected user visits a business, the infection
might spread to customers who visit the business later in the day. Also, the virus can infect
customers which are not included in the dataset, and from them can infect another user who
visits the business in a later moment.
In the dataset, 143, 780 users have at least one encounter, with an average number of encoun-
ters, or encounter degree, of 3.9. The distribution is shown in Figure 1 (circles). Figure 2 shows
a heat map of friend degree and encounter degree of users. Despite friend degree and encounter
degree are correlated (Pearson product-moment correlation 0.3416, p-value < 2.2 · 10−16), the
similarity of the sets of the friends and encounters of an individual is low. Considering the
72, 786 users with at least one friend and one encounter, the average Jaccard similarity of their
encounter and friend sets is 0.01716, with only 9, 527 of them with a value different than zero.
Despite epidemic processes spreading on the friendship and on the encounter network evolve in a
qualitatively similar way, the differences in local connectivity determined by the two definitions
of edges result in very different sets of nodes predicted to be at risk.
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Fig. 2. Heat map of friend degree and encounter degree of all users with at least one friend and one encounter (friend degree
and encounter degree are limited to 200 in the plot).
For each t ∈ T , U(t) = {u ∈ U : (u, b, t) ∈ R for some b ∈ B} is the set of users who wrote a
review on day t. We refer to U(t) as the active users on day t.
For each t ∈ T and u ∈ U(t), Eu(t) = {v ∈ U(t), v , u : (u, b, t) ∈ R and (v, b, t) ∈
R for some b ∈ B} ⊆ U is the set of encounters of user u on day t (i.e., users who visited
at least one of the businesses visited by u). E(t) = ∪u∈U{(u, v) : v ∈ Eu(t)} ⊆ U × U is the set of
encounters on day t.
For each t ∈ T , let NE(t) = (U, E(t)) be the network defined by the encounters on day t.
Observe that the node set in the definition is U rather than U(t). The encounter network is the
sequence {NE(t)}t∈T . As connectedness is the key property in a spreading process, we consider
the 133, 038 users who had at least one encounter during T .
C. The static encounter network and the time-varying friendship network
To argue that our results are not driven by the static nature of the friendship network as
opposed to the time-varying nature of the encounter network, we define a static version of the
encounter network and a time-varying version of the friendship network and we will show that
similar conclusions hold.
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For each t ∈ T , F(t) = {(u, v) ∈ F : u, v ∈ U(t)} is the set of friendship ties between active users
on day t. Observe that friendship ties are not associated to temporal information (i.e., the time
in which the edge formed is unknown). For each t ∈ T , let NF(t) = (U, F(t)) be the friendship
network between active users. Observe that the node set in the definition is U rather than U(t).
The friendship time-varying network is the sequence {NF(t)}t∈T . We consider the 41, 664 users
who, during T , had at least an active friend on a day in which they were active.
Let Eu = ∪t∈T Eu(t) ⊆ U be the set of encounters of u during T , and E = ∪t∈T ∪u∈U {(u, v) :
v ∈ E(t)} ⊆ U ×U be the set of encounters between users in U. The static encounter network is
NE = (U, E). We restrict our attention to the giant component of the static encounter network,
which includes 113, 187 users (whereas the second largest component has 23 users).
III. Infection dynamics
To model the spread of an infectious disease, we consider a Susceptible-Infected (SI) pro-
cess [3] , in which nodes never recover after being infected. Here, we give a general definition
of the process that applies to both the static and the time-varying networks defined above. Given
a set of nodes V, a set of edges E ⊆ V × V and a set of time indices T , let {N(t)}t∈T be a
sequence of networks, where N(t) = (V,E(t)) with E(t) ⊆ E. For a static network, E(t) = E for
all of t ∈ T .
Let I(t) denote the set of infected nodes at time t, of cardinality I(t). The infection starts at
time t = 0 from a set I(0) of infected seeds.
Consider any t > 0. The infection spreads from the set of already infected nodes I(t − 1) as
follows. For each non-infected node v ∈ V\I(t − 1), let dv(t) = |{u ∈ I(t − 1) : (u, v) ∈ E(t)|},
that is, the number of neighbors of v at time t which are infected at time t − 1. Let B(t) = {v ∈
V\I(t − 1) : dv(t) > 0}, that is, the set of susceptible nodes at time t. Each node v ∈ B(t) gets
infected with probability βdv(t), where β ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of infection.
When β = 1 the infection process is deterministic and, at time t, all non-infected neighbors
of the nodes infected by time t− 1 become infected. For finite values of β, the infection spreads
in a stochastic way.
For the time-varying networks defined above (i.e., the encounter network and the time-varying
friendship network), T = T . The infection will propagate for |T | time steps, resulting in an
infected population I(|T |). For static networks (i.e., the friendship network and static encounter
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network), T = [0,∞) and the infection propagates until I(t) = V (i.e., until the entire population
is infected).
A. Infection time
Given a realization of the infection process, for each α ∈ [0, 1] let
τ(α) = min{t : I(t)/|V| ≥ α}.
τ(α) is a random variable and represents the first time in which an α-fraction of the nodes V are
infected (once I(0) is fixed, τ(α) is a degenerate random variable for β = 1). Given a realization
of the SI process on a time-varying network, let τ(α) = ∞ for α > I(|T |)/|V|.
We also consider the number, rather than the fraction, of infected nodes. Given a realization
of the infection process, for each M ∈ [0, |V|], let
t(M) = min{t : I(t) ≥ M},
The random variable t(M) denotes the first time in which at least M nodes are infected. Given
a realization of the SI process on a time-varying network, let t(M) = ∞ for M > I(|T |).
B. Seed selection
In a static network, seeds are chosen at random and without replacement. In a time-varying
network, the infection can start propagating at the first time t in which there is an edge between
an infected seed and a non-infected node, that is, at time
t0(I(0)) = min{t : ∃(u, v) ∈ E(t) for some u ∈ I(0), v ∈ V\I(0)}.
As a remark, for β < 1, it is possible that no node is infected at time t0. Seeds are selected
uniformly at random and without replacement among all nodes v ∈ V such that t0({v}) ≤ 500,
that is, nodes that have a neighbor in the time-varying network by time t = 500.
C. Detection time with sensors
In real scenarios, it might be infeasible to monitor all nodes in the network. Constraints of
different nature (e.g., budget, physical, privacy) might limit the researchers to monitor a subset
S ⊂ V of all nodes, referred to as sensors. At each time t, let IS (t) = I(t) ∩ S be the set of
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infected sensors, and IS (t) be its cardinality. Assuming as before that the network and the set of
seeds are given, for each α ∈ [0, 1] let
τS (α) = min{t : IS (t)/|S | ≥ α}.
That is, τS (α) represents the first time in which an α-fraction of the sensors S are infected. Given
a realization of the SI process on a time-varying network, let τS (α) = ∞ for α > IS (|T |)/|S |.
We consider two types of sensor selection, random sensors and friend sensors, defined as
follows. Let m be a fixed parameter. A set S of random sensors is obtained by selecting m nodes
from V uniformly at random and without replacement. A set S of friend sensors is obtained in
two steps. First, S is initialized as the empty set, and a set S 0 of random nodes is obtained by
selecting m users from V uniformly at random and without replacement. Then, for each node
u ∈ S 0, a friend v ∈ V is selected uniformly at random from Fu (i.e., from the set of friends
of u) and added to S . We require each friend sensor to be in V and to be friend of a node in
S 0. We remark that, even for encounter networks, friend sensors are selected on the basis of
friendship rather than encounter. We make this assumption because explicit relationships (such
as friendship, family or professional ties) might be accessible or inferable in a real setting in
which the researcher has to select a set of sensors. Observe that, in the case of friend sensors,
the size of the resulting set S might be smaller than m.
Given the fact that, on average, people have fewer friends than their friends have (also know
and the friendship paradox [29]), randomly sampled friends are more connected than randomly
sampled individuals and are shown to provide earlier detection of phenomena spreading over
complex networks [21], [33].
IV. Friendship distance and epidemic risk
In this section we show that distance on the friendship network is correlated to epidemic rick.
Given and infection initiated at a single seed and spreading on the encounter network, nodes at a
shorter distance from the seed on the encounter network have a higher probability of becoming
infected. In the rest of the section, we always consider infections spreading on the encounter
network and distance defined on the friendship network.
Given nodes s and s′ in the friendship network, let d(s, s′) denote their distance (i.e., the
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length of the shortest path connecting them). Given node s and an integer d > 0, let
Nd(s) = {s : d(s, s′) = d}
be the set of nodes at distance d from s, and let nd(s) be its cardinality. N1(s) and nd(s) denote
the set of neighbors and the degree of s, respectively.
Let i denote an infection process, and si the selected seed. Given an infection initiated at a
seed si until time T , let I(si) be the set of infected nodes at time T . For each d > 0 let
Id(si) = I(si) ∩ Nd(s)
be the set of infected nodes that are at distance d from si on the encounter network. The infection
rate of nodes at distance d from si is defined as
rd(si) =
|Id(si)|
nd(s)
.
The empirical average of rd(si) over S simulations is given by
r¯d =
1
S
S∑
i=1
rd(si),
and represents the risk of becoming infected if the seed is at distance d.
As the spreading of an infection process depends on the infection rate β, we write r¯d(β)
to compare infection processes with different infection rate. Given a node s in the encounter
network, we recall that t0({s}) is the first time period in which s has an edge (that is, the
smallest t such that Eu(t) > 0). As we consider infections spreading on the encounter network
and distance on the friendship network, we consider seeds that are present in both networks. In
each simulation, a single seed is selected uniformly at random between all nodes s ∈ |UF ∩UE |
such that t0({s}) ≤ 500 (as infections on time-varying networks spread for a limited number of
time steps, we require them to start early enough). For each β ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5} we run 10, 000
simulations. The empirical estimates of r¯d(β) for 1 ≤ d ≤ 10 are shown in Figure 3 and Table I.
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TABLE I
Epidemic risk with respect to distance on the friendship network.
β r¯1(β) r¯2(β) r¯3(β) r¯4(β) r¯5(β) r¯6(β) r¯7(β) r¯8(β) r¯9(β) r¯10(β)
0.10 3.9·10−3 7.1·10−4 2.1·10−4 7.01·10−05 3.2·10−05 2.3·10−05 1.3·10−05 2.1·10−05 1.1·10−05 0
0.25 0.041 0.027 0.014 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 1.6·10−4
0.50 0.159 0.143 0.095 0.055 0.036 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.025 0.007
1.00 0.343 0.333 0.262 0.182 0.133 0.118 0.116 0.123 0.131 0.049
Fig. 3. Epidemic risk with respect to distance on the friendship network. Empirical estimates of r¯d(β) for β ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1}
and 1 ≤ d ≤ 10. For each value of the infection rate β, 10000 simulations are run, each initiated at a random seed.
V. The limits of the friendship network
In this section, we consider SI processes on the the (time-varying) encounter network {NE(t)}t∈T ,
the static version of the encounter network NE and (static) friendship network NF , initiated at
single seeds (i.e., I(0) = {s}).
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As mentioned above, we identify the friendship network and the static encounter network
with their giant components. We refer to the corresponding sets of nodes as UF , with cardinality
nF = |UF | = 168, 923 users, and U (s)E , and n(s)E = |U (s)E | = 113, 187. Similarly, for the encounter
network, we only consider users who had at least an encounter during the period of observation,
that is, u such that Eu(t) > 0 for some t. We refer to the set of these users as U
(t)
E , and nE =
|U (t)E | = 133, 038.
Our objective is to compare the infection processes on the three different networks at a
microscopic level, with the goal of evaluating both the friendship network and the static encounter
network as predictors of epidemic risk on the (time-varying) encounter network. In order to do
that, we compare the sets of nodes that become infected on the three networks during independent
infection processes starting at the same seed. We therefore consider infection seeds that are
present in all networks. Given a node s in the encounter network, we recall that t0({s}) is the
first time period in which s has an edge (that is, the smallest t such that Eu(t) > 0). In each
simulation, a single seed is selected uniformly at random between all nodes s ∈ UF ∩U (s)E ∩U (t)E
such that t0({s}) ≤ 500 (as infections on time-varying networks spread for a limited number of
time steps, we require them to start early enough).
By considering both certain infection processes (β = 1) and stochastic infection processes
(β < 1), we characterize how predictions of epidemic risk are affected by the structural differences
between the networks, but their time-varying or static nature, and by the randomness of the
infection processes. To take into account the different edge density (and therefore the different
speed of the infection process) on the encounter and the friendship network, we allow for
different infection rates: βF on the friendship network, βE(t) on the encounter network, and βE(s)
on the static encounter network. In Section V-B, we consider the case of βF = βE(t) = βE(s) = 1
(certain infection), and show that the friendship network provides less accurate prediction of
epidemic risk than the static encounter network. In this case, given a seed, the differences
between epidemic processes spreading on the three networks are solely determined by structural
differences. Our analyses suggest that the limits of the friendship network in predicting epidemic
risk are not only due to its static nature as opposed to the time-varying nature of the encounter
network, but also to the topological differences arising from the different semantic of the edges.
In Section V-C, we set betaE(t) = βE(s) = 0.5 and βF = 0.01 (stochastic infection), and show that
also in this case the friendship network provides less accurate prediction of epidemic risk than the
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static encounter network. Our analyses show that structural differences between friendship and
encounter networks introduce more unpredictability than the randomness of the infection process.
Randomness introduces a certain amount of unpredictability in the spread of the infection, and
two runs of the process on the same network starting from the same seed can result in different
sets of infected nodes. However, we observe that the unpredictability within a given network is
substantially lower than the unpredictability between the two different networks. Moreover, this
unpredictability is not attributable only to the static nature of the friendship network as opposed to
the time-varying nature of the encounter network, as the static version of the encounter network
provides more accurate prediction of epidemic risk than the friendship network. That is, the
limits of the friendship network in predicting epidemic risk are primarily due to the structural
differences between the two networks.
A. Metrics
Fixed a seed si, let IE(t)1 (t; si) and IE(t)2 (t; si) denote the set of infected nodes at time t in
two independent infection processes on the encounter network starting at si. IE(s)1 (t; si) and
IE(s)2 (t; si) (resp. IF1(t; si) and IF2(t; si)) are similarly defined by considering the static encounter
(resp. friendship) network. Let IE(t)1 (t; si), IE(t)2 (t; si), IE(s)1 (t; si), IE(s)2 (t; si), IF1(t; si), IF2(t; si) be their
cardinality. For j = 1, 2, let
tE(t)j (m; si) = min{t ∈ T : IE(t)j (t; si) ≥ m}
tE(s)j (m; si) = min{t ∈ T : IE(s)j (t; si) ≥ m}
tF j(m; si) = min{t ∈ T : IF j(t; si) ≥ m}
be the minimum time at which at least m nodes are infected in the corresponding process.
tE(t)j (m; si) is undefined if m nodes never get infected in the corresponding process (on the
encounter network), and similar for the other processes.
If tE(t)j (m; si) is defined, then the corresponding infected set is
I∗
E(t)j
(m; si) = IE(t)j (tE(t)j (m; si)).
Instead, tE(s)j (m) and tF j(m) are always defined on the static encounter network and on the
friendship network (on which the infection process continues until the entire population is
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infected), and the corresponding infected sets are
I∗
E(s)j
(m; si) = I(s)E (tE(s)j (m; si)).
I∗F j(m; si) = IF(tF j(m; si)).
When the relevant values I∗
E(t)j
(m; si), I∗E(s)j (m; si) and I
∗
Fk
(m; si) for j, k ∈ {1, 2} are defined, we
define the following measures of Jaccard similarity,
JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) =
|I∗
E(t)1
(m; si) ∩ I∗E(t)2 (m; si)|
|I∗
E(t)1
(m; si) ∪ I∗E(t)2 (m; si)|
,
JE(t)j ,Fk(m; si) =
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si) ∩ I∗Fk(m; si)|
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si) ∪ I∗Fk(m; si)|
,
JE(s)j ,Fk(m; si) =
|I∗
E(s)j
(m; si) ∩ I∗Fk(m; si)|
|I∗
E(s)j
(m; si) ∪ I∗Fk(m; si)|
.
JE(t)j ,Fk(m; si) and JE(t)j ,E(s)k (m; si) are the similarities between the infected sets (for a target m) in
two infection processes initiated at the same seed but evolving on the two different networks.
JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) is the similarity between the infected sets (for a target m) in the two independent
processes on the encounter network. In the case of βE = 1, the process on the encounter network
is deterministic and JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) is not considered.
When the relevant values I∗
E(t)j
(m; si), I∗E(s)j (m; si) and I
∗
Fk
(m; si) for j, k ∈ {1, 2} are defined, we
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also define the following measures of precision,
PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) =
|I∗
E(t)1
(m; si) ∩ I∗E(t)2 (m; si)|
|I∗
E(t)1
(m; si)| ,
PE(t)j ,Fk(m; si) =
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si) ∩ I∗Fk(m; si)|
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si)| ,
PE(t)j ,E(s)k (m; si) =
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si) ∩ I∗E(s)k (m; si)|
|I∗
E(t)j
(m; si)| ,
PE(s)j ,E(t)k (m; si) =
|I∗
E(s)j
(m; si) ∩ I∗E(t)k (m; si)|
|I∗
E(s)j
(m; si)| ,
PF j,E(t)k (m; si) =
|I∗F j(m; si) ∩ I∗E(t)k (m; si)|
|I∗F j(m; si)|
.
For target m, PE(t)j ,Fk(m; si) is the fraction of nodes infected in the process with index j in the
encounter network that are also infected in the process with index k in the encounter network
(started at the same seed). The other quantities are similarly interpreted.
A comparison between JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) is not straightforward for the lack of an
upper bound for JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si). There are nI = 76, 933 nodes in the intersection of the friendship
and encounter network and nU = 225, 028 nodes in their union. Therefore, for large values of
target m, JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) is upper bounded by nI/nU = 0.3419. A bound that is independent of si
cannot be derived for general values of m, for which JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) is not constrained to have
small values. However, JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) can be as large as 1 for all values of m. To take this into
account, we also define a rescaled version of the Jaccard similarity,
J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) =
JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si)
JU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m)
,
where JU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m) = maxsi JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) is the empirical upper bound for JE(t)1 ,F1(m; ·) (computed
over all simulations). We similarly define rescaled versions of the other similarity measures,
considering the unions and intersections of the relevant sets of nodes.
The same argument hold for the precision measures for the lack of a straightforward upper
bound for PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and PF1,E(t)1 (m; si). For large values of m, PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and PF1,E(t)1 (m; si) are
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upper bounded by nI/nE = 0.5782 and nI/nF = 0.4554, respectively. Bounds that are independent
of si cannot be derived for general values of m. However, PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si) can be as large as 1
for all values of m. To take this consideration into account, we define rescaled version of the
precision measures, for example,
P¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) =
PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si)
PU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m)
,
where PU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m) is an empirical upper bound obtained taking the maximum over all simula-
tions. We similarly define rescaled versions of the other similarity measures, considering the
intersections of the relevant sets of nodes.
B. Case 1: certain infection
We ran 5000 groups of simulations of the SI process with βF = βE(t) = βE(s) = 1. For
each group of simulations, a single seed is selected uniformly at random among all nodes
s ∈ UF ∩ U (s)E ∩ U (t)E (present in all three networks) such that t0(si) ≤ 500 (that is, we consider
nodes that have an encounter by time t = 500). For each choice of the seed, we separately
run one infection process on each network. Therefore, each seed selection is associated to three
simulations: one on the encounter network (E(t)1 ), one on the static encounter network (E
(s)
1 ), one
on the friendship network (F1). For target set size m ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000}
and each of the 5000 seeds si, we consider the metrics above when they are defined. In
particular, we consider the similarity metrics JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and the precision metrics
PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m; si), PF1,E(t)1 (m; si). That is, fixed a seed si, we compare the
infection processes on the encounter network with those on each static network.
Figure 4 plots the measures JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si) in the left and right panels respec-
tively. Observations for a given value of m constitute a block on the x-axis (larger values of
m correspond to x positions on the right) and are represented with the same color. For a fixed
value of m, relative x positions are irrelevant. For a given metric and each value m, the black
point represents the average of the metric over all observations such that the metric is defined,
and the bars represent standard deviations.
Table II reports the averages of the measures JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), denoted by
〈JE(t)1 ,F1(m)〉 and 〈JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉, together with their normalized versions 〈J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m)〉 and 〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉
and their empirical upper bounds JU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m) and JU
E(t)1 ,E
(s)
1
(m).
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TABLE II
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Certain infection -
Similarity measures.
m 〈JE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈J¯E(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 J
U
E(t)1 ,F1
(m) JU
E(t)1 ,E
(s)
1
(m)
500 0.013 0.050 0.100 0.228 0.133 0.218
1000 0.020 0.062 0.221 0.361 0.091 0.170
2000 0.030 0.083 0.322 0.525 0.094 0.157
5000 0.052 0.128 0.506 0.641 0.103 0.200
10000 0.079 0.185 0.660 0.720 0.120 0.258
20000 0.119 0.273 0.764 0.779 0.157 0.354
For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average
than JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) (p-values< 2.2 · 10
−16). For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the
hypotheses that J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) (p-values= 0.0116 for m = 20000,
p-values< 2.2 · 10−16 for other values of m). That is, the similarity between the sets of infected
nodes on the encounter network and on the static encounter network is larger than the similarity
between the sets of infected nodes on the encounter network and on the friendship network.
Table III reports the averages of the precision measures PE(t)1 ,F1(m) and PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m), their
empirical upper bounds, and the averages of the rescaled measures. Table IV reports the averages
of the precision measures PF1,E(t)1 (m) and PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m), their empirical upper bounds, and the
averages of the rescaled measures. For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses
that PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and that PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m) has larger average than
PF1,E(t)1 (m; si)(p-values< 2.2·10
−16). For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses
that P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than P¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and that P¯E(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m) has larger average
than P¯F1,E(t)1 (m; si)(p-values< 2.2 · 10
−16). That is, infections on the encounter network are better
approximated by infections on the static encounter network than by infection on the friendship
network.
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TABLE III
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Certain infection -
Precision measures.
m 〈PE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 P
U
E(t)1 ,F1
(m) PU
E(t)1 ,E
(s)
1
(m)
500 0.177 0.298 0.388 0.388 0.594 0.766
1000 0.211 0.340 0.435 0.435 0.654 0.781
2000 0.259 0.392 0.478 0.478 0.648 0.821
5000 0.345 0.498 0.570 0.570 0.684 0.875
10000 0.405 0.583 0.647 0.647 0.688 0.902
20000 0.446 0.668 0.714 0.714 0.686 0.937
TABLE IV
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Certain infection -
Precision measures.
m 〈PF1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 P
U
F1 ,E
(t)
1
(m) PU
E(s)1 ,E
(t)
1
(m)
500 0.016 0.064 0.070 0.197 0.230 0.322
1000 0.025 0.078 0.180 0.289 0.137 0.268
2000 0.038 0.104 0.224 0.437 0.168 0.238
5000 0.064 0.159 0.382 0.508 0.168 0.314
10000 0.097 0.225 0.481 0.602 0.202 0.376
20000 0.147 0.327 0.585 0.677 0.252 0.487
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Fig. 4. Single seed infection on encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks – Certain infection
– Similarity measures. The two panels show the metrics JE(t)1 ,F1 (m; si) and JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), for 5000 random choices of a single
seeds, and different values of the target set size m. For each seed, one simulation on the friendship network, one simulation on
the encounter network and one simulation on the static encounter network are run separately. Each panel considers, for each
of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on two different networks. On the x- axis, observations for a given value of m form a
block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). We only consider pairs (m, si) for which the metrics
are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over all observations such
that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 5. Single seed infection on encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks – Certain infection
– Precision measures. The four panels show the metrics PE(t)1 ,F1 (m) (top-left), PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) (top-right), PF1 ,E(t)1 (m) (bottom-left)
and PE(s)1 ,E
(t)
1
(m) (bottom-right), for 5000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values of the target set size m. For
each seed, one simulation on the friendship network, one simulation on the encounter network and one simulation on the static
encounter network are run separately. Each panel considers, for each of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on two different
networks. On the x- axis, observations for a given value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position
is irrelevant). We only consider pairs (m, si) for which the metrics are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black
point represents the average of the metric over all observations such that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard
deviations.
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C. Case 2: stochastic infection
We ran 5000 groups of simulations of the SI process with βF = 0.01 and βE(t) = βE(s) = 0.5. For
each group of simulations, a single seed is selected uniformly at random among all nodes s ∈
UF∩U (s)E ∩U (t)E (present in all three networks) such that t0(si) ≤ 500 (that is, we consider nodes that
have an encounter by time t = 500). For each choice of the seed, we run two independent infection
processes on each network. Therefore, each seed selection is associated to six simulations: one
on the encounter network (E(t)1 , E
(t)
2 ), one on the static encounter network (E
(s)
1 , E
(s)
1 ), one on the
friendship network (F1, F2). For target set size m ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000} and
each of the 5000 seeds si, we consider the metrics above when they are defined. In particular, we
consider the similarity metrics JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and the precision metrics
PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si), PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m; si), PF1,E(t)1 (m; si). That is,
fixed a seed si, we compare the two infection processes on the encounter network, and the the
infections on the encounter network with those on each static network.
Figure 6 plots the measures JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si) and JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) in the left, middle
and right panels respectively. Observations for a given value of m constitute a block on the x-axis
(larger values of m correspond to x positions on the right) and are represented with the same
color. For a fixed value of m, relative x positions are irrelevant. For a given metric and each
value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over all observations such that the
metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
Table V reports the averages of the measures JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si) and JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si)
denoted by 〈JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉, 〈JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 and 〈JE(t)1 ,F1(m)〉, together with their normalized versions
〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉, 〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉, 〈J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m)〉 and their empirical upper bounds J
U
E(t)1 ,E
(t)
2
(m), JU
E(t)1 ,E
(s)
1
(m)
and JU
E(t)1 ,F1
(m).
For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m) has larger average
than JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) and JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and that JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) (p-
values< 2.2 · 10−16). The similarity of the infected sets on two independent runs of the infection
process within the encounter network is larger than the similarities of the infected sets between
different networks. In addition, the similarity between the sets of infected nodes on the encounter
network and on the static encounter network is larger than the similarity between the sets of
infected nodes on the encounter network and on the friendship network. For all values of m,
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TABLE V
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Stochastic infection -
Similarity measures.
m 〈JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈JE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈J¯E(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉
500 0.115 0.039 0.012 0.270 0.315 0.323
1000 0.159 0.056 0.019 0.325 0.561 0.454
2000 0.220 0.082 0.031 0.438 0.716 0.615
5000 0.316 0.129 0.056 0.571 0.776 0.744
10000 0.397 0.178 0.081 0.664 0.790 0.806
20000 0.466 0.249 0.110 0.788 0.835 0.830
two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that J¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m) has smaller average than J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)
and J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) (p-values< 2.2 · 10
−16). The hypotheses that J¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than
J¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) is supported for m ∈ {1000, 2000, 5000} (p-values< 0.0248) and the null hypothesis
of equal mean cannot be rejected for the other values of m. These analyses support the idea that
topological differences accentuate the unpredictability of epidemic risk using the static networks,
particularly in the case of the friendship network
Table VI reports the averages of the precision measures PE(t)1 ,F1(m), PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) and PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m),
their empirical upper bounds, and the averages of the rescaled measures. Table VII reports the
averages of the precision measures PF1,E(t)1 (m), PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m) and PE(2)1 ,E(t)2 (m), their empirical upper
bounds, and the averages of the rescaled measures (note that PE(2)1 ,E(t)2 (m) and PE(2)2 ,E(t)1 (m) are
practically the same quantity). For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypothe-
ses that PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m) has larger average than PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m), PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m), PF1,E(t)1 (m; si),
that PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and that PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m) has larger average
than PF1,E(t)1 (m; si) (p-values< 2.2 · 10
−16). For the rescaled measures, For all values of m,
two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that P¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m) has smaller average than P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m),
P¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si), P¯E(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m), P¯F1,E(t)1 (m; si) (p-values< 2.2 · 10
−16), that P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average
than P¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si) (p-values< 0.00679), and, for m , 10000, that P¯E(s)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average
than P¯F1,E(t)1 (m; si) (p-values< 0.00679), For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the
hypotheses that P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) has larger average than P¯E(t)1 ,F1(m; si), and that P¯E(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m) has larger
average than P¯F1,E(t)1 (m; si)(p-values< 5.8e · 10
−7). As above, these analyses support the idea that
topological differences accentuate the unpredictability of epidemic risk using the static networks,
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TABLE VI
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Stochastic infection -
Precision measures.
m 〈PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈PE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉
500 0.194 0.078 0.034 0.323 0.350 0.305
1000 0.257 0.112 0.055 0.391 0.591 0.407
2000 0.338 0.158 0.083 0.506 0.720 0.515
5000 0.456 0.235 0.129 0.641 0.782 0.637
10000 0.551 0.306 0.167 0.737 0.804 0.754
20000 0.631 0.402 0.209 0.849 0.861 0.810
TABLE VII
Single seed infection on the encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks. Stochastic infection -
Precision measures.
m 〈PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈PE(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈PF1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈P¯E(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m)〉 〈P¯E(s)1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉
500 0.194 0.078 0.034 0.323 0.330 0.299
1000 0.257 0.112 0.055 0.392 0.572 0.417
2000 0.338 0.158 0.083 0.505 0.728 0.577
5000 0.456 0.235 0.129 0.640 0.777 0.706
10000 0.551 0.306 0.167 0.737 0.827 0.802
20000 0.631 0.402 0.209 0.849 0.869 0.833
particularly in the case of the friendship network
The intersection between the infected sets in the friendship network and the encounter network
(considering infection started at the same seed) is much larger than the intersection of random
sets, for each target set size (two-sample t-tests, p-values< 2.2 · 10−16). Figure 8 shows the
Jaccard similarity of the infected sets on the encounter and friendship networks (left, for the
5000 simulations considered above) and of random sets of the given target size sampled from
the two networks (right, 5000 pairs of random sets for each target size). Table VIII shows
the averages of the metrics JE(t)1 ,F1(m; si), PE(t)1 ,F1(m; si) and PF1,E(t)1 (m; si) for the 5000 pairs of
simulations and the averages of the corresponding metrics for the 5000 pairs of random sets.
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TABLE VIII
Comparison with intersection of random sets. Stochastic infection - Similarity and precision measures.
m 〈JE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈J
rand
E(t)1 ,F1
(m)〉 〈PE(t)1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈P
rand
E(t)1 ,F1
(m)〉 〈PF1 ,E(t)1 (m)〉 〈P
rand
F1 ,E
(t)
1
(m)〉
500 0.012 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.011 0.002
1000 0.019 0.002 0.031 0.003 0.017 0.003
2000 0.031 0.003 0.047 0.007 0.028 0.007
5000 0.056 0.009 0.071 0.017 0.050 0.017
10000 0.081 0.017 0.086 0.034 0.071 0.034
20000 0.110 0.035 0.092 0.069 0.084 0.069
Fig. 6. Single seed infection on encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks – Stochastic
infection – Similarity measures. The three panels show the metrics JE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m; si), JE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m; si) and JE(t)1 ,F1 (m; si), for 5000
random choices of a single seeds, and different values of the target set size m. For each seed, one simulation on the friendship
network, two simulations on the encounter network, two on the static encounter network, and two on the friendship network
are run separately. Each panel considers, for each of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on two different networks. On the x-
axis, observations for a given value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). We
only consider pairs (m, si) for which the metrics are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents
the average of the metric over all observations such that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 7. Single seed infection on encounter network and the static (encounter and friendship) networks – Stochastic
infection – Precision measures. The six panels show the metrics PE(t)1 ,E(t)2 (m) (top-left), PE(t)1 ,E(s)1 (m) (top-center), PE(t)1 ,F1 (m)
(top-right), PE(t)2 ,E
(t)
1
(m) (bottom-left), PE(s)1 ,E
(t)
1
(m) (bottom-center), PF1 ,E(t)1
(m) (bottom-right), for 5000 random choices of a single
seeds, and different values of the target set size m. For each seed, one simulation on the friendship network, two simulations on
the encounter network, two on the static encounter network, and two on the friendship network are run separately. Each panel
considers, for each of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on two different networks. On the x- axis, observations for a given
value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). We only consider pairs (m, si) for
which the metrics are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over
all observations such that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 8. Comparison with the intersection of random sets – Stochastic infection – Similarity measures. The left panels
shows the metrics JE(t)1 ,F1
(m; si), for 5000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values of the target set size m. For
each seed, one simulation on the friendship network and one on the encounter network are run independently. The right panel
shows the same metric for pairs of random sets sampled from the two networks (5000 pairs for each target set size). On the
x- axis, observations for a given value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant).
For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over all observations, and the bars
represent standard deviations.
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VI. Epidemic risk: comparison between the time-varying networks
To argue that our results are not driven by the static nature of the friendship network as opposed
to the time-varying nature of the encounter network, in this section we compare the encounter
network with the time-varying friendship network defined in Section II-C. In Section VII, we
compare the friendship network with the static encounter network defined in Section II-C. In both
cases, the sets of individuals predicted to be at risk by friendship appear a poor approximation
of those at risk in a process spreading according to physical encounter. As before, we consider
seed nodes that are present in both the friendship and the encounter network, and we compare
the sets of nodes that become infected in independent processes on the two different networks
initiated at the same seed.
We ran 5000 groups of simulations of the SI process with β = 0.5. For each group of simu-
lations, a single seed is selected at random among all nodes si such that t0(si) ≤ 500 in both the
encounter and the time-varying friendship networks. For each choice of the seed, we separately
run two infection processes on the encounter network and two infection processes on the time-
varying friendship network. Therefore, each seed selection is associated to four simulations
(referred to as E1, E2, F1, F2). For target set size m ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000} and
each of the 5000 seeds si, we consider the similarity and precision metrics defined above.
Figure 9 plots the Jaccard similarity measures JE1,F1(m; si), JE1,E2(m; si), JF1,F2(m; si) in the top-
left, top-right and bottom panels respectively. Observations for a given value of m constitute a
block on the x-axis (larger values of m correspond to x positions on the right) and are represented
with the same color. For a fixed value of m, relative x positions are irrelevant. For a given metric
and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over all observations such
that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
For all values of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that JE1,F1(m; si) has smaller av-
erage than JE1,E2(m; si) and JF1,F2(m; si), and that JE1,E2(m; si) has smaller average than JF1,F2(m; si)
(p-values< 2.2 · 10−16). A comparison between JE1,F1(m; si), JE1,E2(m; si), and JF1,F2(m; si) is not
straightforward for the lack of an upper bound for JE1,F1(m; si). There are nI = 31, 735 nodes
in the intersection of the time-varying friendship and encounter network and nU = 142, 967
nodes in their union. Therefore, for large values of target m, JE1,F1(m; si) is upper bounded by
nI/nU = 0.2219. A bound that is independent of si cannot be derived for general values of
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TABLE IX
Single seed infection on the time-varying networks. Jaccard similarity measures: average of original measures, average of
rescaled measures.
m 〈J¯E1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈J¯E1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈J¯F1 ,F2 (m)〉 〈JE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈JE1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈JF1 ,F2 (m)〉
500 0.3656 0.2597 0.5636 0.0403 0.1194 0.4432
1000 0.4177 0.3437 0.6526 0.0539 0.1655 0.5273
2000 0.4425 0.4504 0.7377 0.0715 0.2287 0.5882
5000 0.5449 0.5936 0.8390 0.1088 0.3270 0.6418
10000 0.6978 0.6813 0.91091 0.1571 0.4037 0.6829
20000 0.8765 0.7951 0.9668 0.19181 0.4695 0.7149
m, for which JE1,F1(m; si) is not constrained to have small values. However, JE1,E2(m; si) and
JF1,F2(m; si) can be as large as 1 for all values of m. As before, we consider rescaled versions
of the Jaccard similarity. Table IX reports the averages of the original and rescaled measures
of Jaccard similarity. Two-sample t-tests support the hypothesis that J¯E1,F1(m; si) has a larger
average than J¯E1,E2(m; si) for m ∈ {500, 1000, 5000, 10000, 20000} (p-values smaller that 0.0078),
whereas the null hypothesis of equal mean is not rejected for m = 2000. For all values of
m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that J¯E1,F1(m; si) and J¯E1,E2(m; si) have a smaller
average than J¯F1,F2(m; si) (p-values< 2.2 ·10−16). The rescaled versions of the similarity measures
suggest that the differences in local connectivity between the two networks play a major role
in the inability of friendship to predict individuals at risk given a process driven by physical
encounter.
Figure 10 plots the precision measures PE1,F1(m; si), PE1,E2(m; si), PF1,F2(m; si) in the top-left,
top-right and bottom panels respectively. Observations for a given value of m constitute a block
on the x-axis (larger m correspond to x positions on the right) and are represented with the same
color. For a fixed value of m, relative x positions are irrelevant. For a given metric and each
value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over all observations such that the
metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
Table X reports the averages of the original and rescaled precision metrics. For all values
of m, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that both PE1,F1(m; si) and PF1,E1(m; si) have
smaller average than both PE1,E2(m; si) and PF1,F2(m; si), and that PE1,E2(m; si) has smaller average
than PF1,F2(m; si) (p-values< 2.2 · 10−16). For all vales of m, two-sample t-tests support the
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TABLE X
Single seed infection on the time-varying networks. Precision measures: average of original and rescaled measures.
m 〈P¯E1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,E1 (m)〉 〈P¯E1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,F2 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈PF1 ,F2 (m)〉
500 0.3770 0.3996 0.3149 0.6484 0.07945 0.07527 0.2002 0.5797
1000 0.4288 0.4610 0.4075 0.7339 0.1026 0.1010 0.2660 0.6585
2000 0.4760 0.4775 0.5187 0.8067 0.1329 0.1325 0.3497 0.7150
5000 0.5828 0.5840 0.6604 0.8837 0.1944 0.1945 0.4691 0.7665
10000 0.7315 0.7308 0.7490 0.9395 0.2687 0.2688 0.5577 0.8047
20000 0.8950 0.8951 0.853 0.9804 0.3213 0.3214 0.6339 0.8334
hypothesis that P¯F1,F2(m; si) has a larger average than all other precision measures. For m ∈
{500, 1000, 20000}, two-sample t-tests support the hypotheses that P¯E1,F1(m; si) and P¯F1,E1(m; si)
have larger average than P¯E1,E2(m; si) (all p-values< 0.001). For m ∈ {500, 1000, 20000}, two-
sample t-tests support the hypotheses that P¯E1,F1(m; si) and P¯F1,E1(m; si) have smaller average
than P¯E1,E2(m; si) (all p-values< 0.002). The null hypothesis that P¯E1,F1(m; si) and P¯F1,E1(m; si)
have equal average is rejected only for m ∈ {500, 1000}, for which the former has larger average
(p-values< 1e − 10). The rescaled versions of the precision measures stress the importance of
the local connectivity properties between the two networks.
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Fig. 9. Single seed infection on time-varying networks – Jaccard similarity. The three panels show the metrics JE1 ,F1 (m; si)
(top-left), JE1 ,E2 (m; si) (top-right) and JF1 ,F2 (m; si) (bottom), for 5000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values
of the target set size m. For each seed, two simulations on the time-varying friendship network and two simulations on the
encounter network are run separately. The top-left panel considers, for each of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on the two
different networks. The top-right panel considers the 5000 pairs of simulations ran on the encounter network. The bottom panel
considers the 5000 pairs of simulations ran on the time-varying friendship network. On the x- axis, observations for a given
value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). We only consider pairs (m, si) for
which the metrics are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over
all observations such that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 10. Single seed infection on time-varying networks – Jaccard similarity. The three panels show the metrics PE1 ,F1 (m; si)
(top-left), PE1 ,E2 (m; si) (top-right) and PF1 ,F2 (m; si) (bottom), for 5000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values
of the target set size m. For each seed, two simulations on the time-varying friendship network and two simulations on the
encounter network are run separately. The top-left panel considers, for each of the 5000 seeds, a pair of simulations on the two
different networks. The top-right panel considers the 5000 pairs of simulations ran on the encounter network. The bottom panel
considers the 5000 pairs of simulations ran on the time-varying friendship network. On the x- axis, observations for a given
value of m form a block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). We only consider pairs m of si for
which the metrics are defined. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of the metric over
all observations such that the metric is defined, and the bars represent standard deviations.
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VII. Epidemic risk: comparison between the static networks
In this section, we compare the friendship network with the static encounter network defined
in Section II-C, in order to argue that our results are not driven by the static nature of the
friendship network as opposed to the time-varying nature of the encounter network. Also in
this case, by comparing several independent runs of the infection process starting at each seed,
we will observe that the unpredictability within a given network is substantially lower than the
unpredictability between the two different networks.
We ran 10, 000 groups of simulations of the SI process with β = 0.01 (stochastic infection).
For each group of simulations, a single seed is selected at random among all nodes si in the
intersection of the two networks (uI = |UE ∩ UF | = 71, 211). For each choice of the seed,
we separately run two infection processes on the static encounter network and two infection
processes on the friendship network (denoted respectively by E1, E2, F1, F2). For target set
size m ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000} and each of the 10000 seeds si, we consider the
similarity and precision metrics defined above. Observe that, as all nodes eventually become
infected in a SI process on a static network, these quantities are defined for all choices of si and
m ≤ n (where n is the number of nodes in the network).
Figure 11 plots the Jaccard similarity measures JE1,F1(m; si), JE1,E2(m; si), JF1,F2(m; si) in the
top-left, top-right and bottom panels respectively. Figure 12 plots the precision measures PE1,F1(m; si),
PE1,E2(m; si), PF1,F2(m; si) in the top-left, top-right and bottom panels respectively. Observations
for a given value of m constitute a block on the x-axis (larger m corresponds to x positions on
the right) and are represented with the same color. For a fixed value of m, relative x positions
are irrelevant. For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents the average of
the metric over all the observations and bars represent standard deviations.
JE1,F1(m; si) has smaller average than JE1,E2(m; si), JF1,F2(m; si), and for m > 500, JE1,E2(m; si)
has larger average than JF1,F2(m; si) (two-paired t-tests, p-values< 2.2·10−16). Similarly, PE1,F1(m; si)
and PF1,E1(m; si) have smaller average than PE1,E2(m; si), PF1,F2(m; si), and for JE1,E2(m; si) has
smaller average than JF1,F2(m; si) (two-paired t-tests, p-values< 2.2 · 10−16).
As before, it is not straightforward to rigorously compare the quantities for all values of m.
The metrics JE1,E2(m; si), JF1,F2(m; si), PE1,E2(m; si) and PF1,F2(m; si) can be as large as 1 for all
values of m. Instead, for large m, JE j,Fk(m; si) is upper bounded by uI/uU = 0.338, PE j,Fk(m; si)
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TABLE XI
Single seed infection on the static networks. Jaccard similarity measures: empirical upper bounds, average of original
measures, average of the rescaled measures.
m 〈J¯E1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈J¯E1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈J¯F1 ,F2 (m)〉 〈JE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈JE1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈JF1 ,F2 (m)〉
500 0.28350 0.3004 0.4029 0.01296 0.04653 0.05597
1000 0.4047 0.5387 0.5175 0.02113 0.06772 0.1005
2000 0.5531 0.7045 0.6509 0.03415 0.09841 0.1633
5000 0.7493 0.8779 0.8234 0.06123 0.1550 0.2519
10000 0.8521 0.9310 0.9116 0.09064 0.2120 0.30944
20000 0.9290 0.9568 0.9527 0.1286 0.29213 0.36542
is upper bounded by uI/uE = 0.629, and PF j,Ek(m; si) is upper bounded by uI/uF = 0.422. For
general values of m, tight upper bounds for these quantities depend on si and therefore on the
network structure. Therefore, we consider the rescaled version of the similarity and precision
measures defined above.
Table XI reports the averages of the original and rescaled Jaccard similarity measures. Ta-
ble XII reports the averages of the original and rescaled precision measures. For all values
of m, J¯E1,F1(m; si) has smaller average than J¯E1,E2(m; si) and J¯F1,F2(m; si), and for m > 500,
J¯E1,E2(m; si) has larger average than J¯F1,F2(m; si) (two-sample t-tests, p-values< 2.2 · 10−16). For
all values of m, P¯E1,F1(m; si) has smaller average than P¯E1,E2(m; si) and P¯F1,F2(m; si), whereas
P¯F1,E1(m; si) has smaller average than P¯F1,F2(m; si) for m ∈ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000} and larger for
m ∈ {10000, 20000} (two-sample t-tests, p-values< 2.2 · 10−16). The rescaled measures suggest
that the network structure has a large impact on the spread of the infection between the friendship
and static encounter networks.
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Fig. 11. Single seed infection on the static networks – Jaccard similarity. The three panels show the metrics JE1 ,F1 (m; si)
(top-left), JE1 ,E2 (m; si) (top-right) and JF1 ,F2 (m; si) (bottom), for 10, 000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values
of the target set size m. For each seed, two simulations on the friendship network and two simulations on the static encounter
network are run separately. The top-left panel considers, for each of the 10, 000 seeds, a pair of simulations on the two networks.
The top-right panel considers the 10, 000 pairs of simulations ran on the static encounter network. The bottom panel considers
the 10, 000 pairs of simulations ran on the friendship network. On the x- axis, observations for a given value of m form a
block with a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). For a given metric and each value m, the black point
represents the average of the metric over all the observations and bars represent standard deviations.
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Fig. 12. Single seed infection on the static networks – precision. The three panels show the metrics PE1 ,F1 (m; si) (top-left),
PE1 ,E2 (m; si) (top-right) and PF1 ,F2 (m; si) (bottom), for 10, 000 random choices of a single seeds, and different values of the
target set size m. For each seed, two simulations on the friendship network and two simulations on the static encounter network
are run separately. The top-left panel considers, for each of the 10, 000 seeds, a pair of simulations on the two networks. The
top-right panel considers the 10, 000 pairs of simulations ran on the static encounter network. The bottom panel considers the
10, 000 pairs of simulations ran on the friendship network. On the x- axis, observations for a given value of m form a block with
a constant color (within the block, the x position is irrelevant). For a given metric and each value m, the black point represents
the average of the metric over all the observations and bars represent standard deviations.
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TABLE XII
Single seed infection on the static networks. Precision measures: average of original and rescaled measures.
m 〈P¯E1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,E1 (m)〉 〈P¯E1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈P¯F1 ,F2 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,F1 (m)〉 〈PE1 ,E2 (m)〉 〈PF1 ,F2 (m)〉
500 0.2672 0.2500 0.3122 0.40680 0.03462 0.02112581 0.08868 0.1114
1000 0.3592 0.3707 0.5596 0.4717 0.05561 0.03419 0.12674 0.1901
2000 0.5034 0.4567 0.7011 0.5584 0.08577 0.05527 0.1791 0.2914
5000 0.6867 0.6927 0.8838 0.7317 0.1362 0.1014 0.2685 0.4093
10000 0.7889 0.8461 0.9167 0.8330 0.1811 0.1543 0.3500 0.4755
20000 0.8853 0.9207 0.9553 0.9083 0.2371 0.2198 0.4521 0.5356
VIII. Overcoming the limits of the friendship networks: correction
In the previous sections, in order to evaluate the friendship network as a predictor of epidemic
risk on the encounter network, we initiated epidemic processes at a seed present on both networks
and let them spread independently on the two networks. This corresponds to a case in which the
researcher has access neither to the contacts between individuals nor to the infected population
(on the encounter network) and relies exclusively on the information provided by the friendship
network. In this section, we consider a less extreme scenario in which the researcher has still
knowledge of the friendship network, but, in addition, is able to monitor the infected population
(on the encounter network) at given times. In such a situation, the infection propagation can
be predicted according to the friendship network as long as information about the real infected
population is unavailable. When such information becomes available, the estimated set of infected
individuals (on the friendship network) can be updated to the real set of infected individuals
(on the encounter network). As we show below, the ability to monitor the infection over time
and correct the set of infected individuals overcomes the limits of the friendship networks in
predicting epidemic risk highlighted in the previous sections. In particular, we compare the sets
of infected individuals on the two networks right before each correction and show that a good
level of prediction accuracy is established early in the process and maintained over time. Despite
the level of accuracy decreases with larger window size, even relatively infrequent correction
overcomes the limits of the friendship networks in predicting epidemic risk.
We proceed as follow. Given a seed s the is present in both the encounter and the friendship
network, we consider two SI processes spreading on the two networks. Let IE(t) and IF(t)
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be the sets of infected nodes on the two networks at time t, and let IE(t) and IF(t) be their
cardinality. We have that IE(0) = IF(0) = {s}. We assume that every W time steps the set IE(t)
is available and therefore IF(t) can be corrected accordingly. That is, we consider a “corrected”
version of the infection process on the friendship network, whose set of infected nodes satisfies
the relationship
IF(kW) = IE(kW), for each k > 0.
Between time kW and (k + 1)W − 1 the set IF(t) grows according to the ties of the friendship
network.
We are interested in comparing the sets IE(t) and IF(t) at times t = kW − 1, that is, right
before each correction. Let
JE,F(k; s,W) =
IE(kW − 1) ∩ IF(kW − 1)
IE(kW − 1) ∪ IF(kW − 1) ,
be the Jaccard similarity of the infected sets on the two networks right before a correction.
Similarly, let Let
PF,E(k; s,W) =
IE(kW − 1) ∩ IF(kW − 1)
IF(kW − 1) ,
PE,F(k; s,W) =
IE(kW − 1) ∩ IF(kW − 1)
IE(kW − 1) .
PF,E(k; s,W) represents the fraction of infected nodes before a correction on the friendship
network that are also infected in the encounter network (precision). PE,F(k; s,W) represents the
fraction of infected nodes in the encounter network which were correctly predicted to be infected
before a correction on the friendship network (recall). In addition we consider the relative size
of the infected sets on the two networks,
rE,F(k; s,W) =
IF(kW − 1)
IE(kW − 1) ,
which compares the two infection from a more coarse point of view. All quantities above depend
on the window size W.
For window size W ∈ {10, 20, 50}, we ran 6000 groups of simulations of the SI process with
βF = 0.0001 on the friendship network and βE = 0.5 on the encounter network (we allow for
different infection rates on the two network in order to compensate for their different degree
distributions). For each group of simulations, a single seed is selected uniformly at random
among all nodes s ∈ UF ∩ UE (present in both networks) such that t0(si) ≤ 900 (that is, we
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consider nodes that have an encounter by time t = 900). For each choice of the seed, we run
one infection process on the encounter network for T = 500 time steps (that is, from t = t0(si)
to t = t0(si) + 500). On the friendship network, the infection process is initiated at the same seed
si and spreads according to the ties of the friendship network for T = 500 time steps (at each
time t = kW, it is set IF(kW) = IE(kW)).
Figures 13 to 16 show the average of the defined metrics over all simulations as a function of
time and for all choices of W. Note that, as each infection process is run for T = 500 time steps,
the number of corrections (and therefore the number of points in the plots) depends on the choice
of W and equals T/W. The plots show that the ability to periodically observe the infected sets
on the encounter network (that is, to correct the set IF(kW) at each time window) overcomes
the limitations of the friendship network in predicting epidemic risk that was highlighted in the
previous sections. Interestingly, good accuracy of the prediction (through the friendship network)
emerges early in the process (after the first correction) and is maintained over time with relatively
few observations (with only slight degrade or improvement over time). The accuracy decreases
with larger window size. However, even the largest considered window size (W = 50) guarantees
a good prediction accuracy that slowly increases over time. The particular value of the obtained
results might partially depend on the choice of the infection rates on the two networks.
In order to compare window sizes W = 10 and W = 20, we consider all time steps corre-
sponding to a correction for both choices of W and ignore the first correction (i.e., we consider
times 20k for k > 1). The trend of the average of the Jaccard similarity JE,F(k; s,W) with respect
to time t and window size W is captured by a linear relationship. OLS with interaction between
t and W shows that the Jaccard similarity is lower in the case of W = 20 then W = 10 (−0.0623,
p-value< 2 ·10−16) and slowly decreases over time (−1.126 ·10−3 every 20 time steps for W = 10,
p-value= 1.13·10−15, −3.73·10−3 every 20 time steps for W = 20, p-value= 7.77·10−7). Similarly,
the trend of the average of the precision measure PE,F(k; s,W) with respect to time t and window
size W is captured by a linear relationship. OLS with interaction between t and W shows that
the Jaccard similarity is lower in the case of W = 20 (−0.0478, p-value< 2 · 10−16) and slowly
decreases over time (−1.117 ·10−3 every 20 time steps for W = 10, p-value< 2 ·10−16, −3.04 ·10−4
every 20 time steps for W = 20, p-value= 2.67 · 10−9). The average of the precision measure
PF,E(k; s,W) is lower in the case of W = 20 (−0.0308, p-value< 2 · 10−16) and present not
statistically significant trend with respect to the time t. The trend of the average of size ratio
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Fig. 13. Jaccard similarity of infected sets before corrections. The x-axis shows time. The y-axis shows the measure JE,F(k; s,W)
averaged over 6000 pairs of simulations (each associated to an independent choice of the seed). Subplots consider different
window sizes W.
rE,F(k; s,W) with respect to time t and window size W is captured by a linear relationship. OLS
with interaction between t and W shows that the ratio is lower in the case of W = 20 (−7.66·10−3,
p-value= 8.4 ·10−4) and slowly decreases over time (−1.45 ·10−3 every 20 time steps for W = 10,
p-value< 2 · 10−16, −8.65 · 10−4 every 20 time steps for W = 20, p-value= 1.52 · 10−4).
In order to compare all window sizes W ∈ {10, 20, 50}, we consider all time steps corresponding
to a correction for all choices of W and ignore the first correction (i.e., we consider times 100k for
1 ≤ k ≤ 5). The trends of the average of all defined measures with respect to time t and window
size W are captured by a linear relationships. In the case of Jaccard similarity JE,F(k; s,W), the
metric is lower in the case of W = 50 (−0.188 with respect to W = 10, p-value= 2.74 · 10−10),
value for which it increases over time (3.29 · 10−3 every 100 time steps, p-value= 1.27 · 10−3).
Similar trends as the ones above are found in the case of the precision measures PE,F(k; s,W)
and PF,E(k; s,W). In the case of the relative size of infected sets rE,F(k; s,W), the largest window
size results in a more accurate prediction of the size of the infected set over time (+0.049 with
respect to W = 10, p-value= 2.55 · 10−5).
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Fig. 14. Fraction of infected nodes in the encounter network that are predicted to be infected in the friendship network, before
corrections. The x-axis shows time. The y-axis shows the measure PE,F(k; s,W) averaged over 6000 pairs of simulations (each
associated to an independent choice of the seed). Subplots consider different window sizes W.
Fig. 15. Fraction of predicted infected nodes on the friendship network that are infected in the encounter network, before
corrections. The x-axis shows time. The y-axis shows the measure PF,E(k; s,W) averaged over 6000 pairs of simulations (each
associated to an independent choice of the seed). Subplots consider different window sizes W.
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Fig. 16. Relative size of infected sets before corrections. The x-axis shows time. The y-axis shows the measure rE,F(k; s,W)
averaged over 6000 pairs of simulations (each associated to an independent choice of the seed). Subplots consider different
window sizes W.
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IX. Containment of epidemic outbreaks using the friendship network
In this section, we show that the friendship network encodes useful information for the
containment of epidemic outbreaks. We consider a scenario in which a fixed budget is available
for immunization, corresponding to the number of individuals that can be made immune to the
infection. This budget might represent the total amount of vaccine that is available. Immune
individuals do not get infected and do not infect other individuals (i.e., according to our frame-
work, they are removed from the network). Our goal is to spend the budget in an effective way,
in order to contain the spread of the disease. A simple, straightforward immunization strategy
is to select individuals at random (random immunization). This method is unlikely to target the
most connected individuals and can result in inefficient allocation of the immunization budget.
We propose the strategy of selecting random friends of randomly chosen individuals (friend
immunization). Such strategy is motivated by the “friendship paradox”, the network property for
which the average friend of an individual is more connected than the average individual [29],
and has been proposed to predict the peak of an epidemic outbreak [21] and the spread of
information online [33]. Instead of selecting individuals for immunization at random, the method
first selects random individuals and then gives immunization to a random friend of each selected
individual, according to the friendship network. The method is simple, as its implementation only
requires individuals to name a friend, and is able to target individuals who are more connected
on average. In addition, we consider another benchmark, in which immunization is given to
encounters of random individuals (encounter immunization). This latter method is similar to the
one just described (but selects individuals for immunization according to the static version of the
encounter network rather than the friendship network) but requires knowledge of the encounters
between individuals, that might be unavailable for the reasons discussed in the introduction.
However, given its potential to identify individuals who have a large number of encounters,
it represents an upper bound for the capability of outbreak containment. We do not consider
more sophisticated methods that require the computation of quantities such as nodes degree or
centrality.
We consider infection processes spreading on the encounter network and an immunization
budget b representing the percentage of individuals who can receive immunization. We refer
to b as the immunization rate. The sets of immune individuals depend on the immunization
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method and on the randomness of the selection of individuals, friends and encounters. Let XR(b),
XF(b), XE(b) be respectively three immunization sets obtained with the three described methods
(random, friend and encounter immunization). In the implementation, we guarantee that the three
sets have the same cardinality. Obtaining sets of the same cardinality might require sampling
more individuals in the case of friend and encounter immunization than random immunization
(e.g., the same friend might be named multiple times). However, we don’t consider sampling as
a cost and we focus our attention on the immunization rate.
We consider a wide range of immunization rates, b ∈ {1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%} and compare
them to the case of no immunization (b = 0%). For each value of b, we run 5000 groups of
three simulations. For each group of simulations, a seed si such that t0(si) ≤ 500 is selected
uniformly at random (that is, we consider nodes that have an encounter by time t = 500). Then,
three immunization sets XR(b, si), XF(b, si), XE(b, si) are built according to the three methods
(with the constraint that the seed si cannot receive immunization). Then, three independent SI
processes are initiated at si and spread on the encounter network. In the first process (denoted
by R), individuals in XR(b; si) are immune to the infection. In the second process (denoted by
F), individuals in XF(b; si) are immune to the infection. In the third process (denoted by E),
individuals in XE(b; si) are immune to the infection. Let
rR(b, si), rF(b, si), rE(b, si),
be the final infection rates of the three processes, respectively.
Figure 17 shows the fraction of infections with final infection rate above 0.1% as a function of
the immunization rate b and for all considered immunization methods (random immunization:
red squares, encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green triangles). We
consider a 0.1% target for the final infection rate as an indicator that the infection did not die
out. In the case of no immunization (b = 0%), we observe that only 60% of infections hit the
0.1% target. The the remaining 40% correspond to infections that die out in their early stage.
In the case of random immunization, the fraction of infections that die out is not very sensible
to the immunization rate. In both cases of friend immunization and encounter immunization,
increasing the immunization rate substantially increases the fraction of infections that die out,
suggesting that both methods are effective at preventing outbreaks. The effect is stronger in
the case of encounter immunization. However, friend immunization provides a comparatively
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similar effect to encounter immunization, and a substantial improvement with respect to random
immunization. The trend in Figure 17 is captured by a linear model that considers the interaction
between immunization type and immunization rate. In the case of random immunization, each
1% increase of the immunization rate determines a 0.5% decrease in the fraction of infections
above the 0.1% target (p-value= 0.0299). In the case of friend immunization, each 1% increase
of the immunization rate determines an additional 3.5% (with respect to random immunization)
decrease in the fraction of infections above the 0.1% target (p-value= 4.03 · 108). In the case of
encounter immunization, each 1% increase of the immunization rate determines an additional
2.36% (with respect to random immunization) decrease in the fraction of infections above the
0.1% target (p-value= 2.77 · 106).
Figure 18 shows the average final infection rate among all infections that do not die out
(according to the 0.1% target considered above) as a function of the infection start time t0(si)
(i.e., the first time in which the seed is connected in the encounter network, grouped into bins of
width equal to 50 time steps), for all immunization methods (random immunization: red squares,
encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green triangles) and immunization
rates (subplots). For each value of the immunization rate b, friend immunization provides a
substantial reduction of the average final infection rate with respect to random immunization.
Encounter immunization results in the lowest infection rates. To analyze the trends in Figure 18,
we fit separate models to each subset of simulations with a given immunization rate b, as each
b results in a different number of infections above the 0.1% target (see Figure 17). For example,
in the case of b = 1%, friend immunization results in an average final infection rate 2.4%
lower than random immunization (p-value< 2.2 · 1016), and encounter immunization results in
an average final infection rate 4.4% lower than random immunization (p-value< 2.2 · 1016). A
model considering the interaction of immunization type and infection start time t0(si) shows
similar reduction effects of friend and encounter immunization as above (respectively −2.45%,
p-value< 2.14 · 1012, and −4.65% p-value< 2.2 · 1016) and a decreasing final infection rate with
respect to t0(si) (−0.027% for each time step of delay, p-value< 2.2 · 1016), but slopes do not
depend on the immunization type. Analyses have a similar flavor for the different choices of
the immunization rate b, and the infection containment effect of both friendship and encounter
immunization increases for larger b (fixed effects of linear models). In addition, for larger b,
the decrease of the average final infection rate with respect to t0(si) is less steep in the case of
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both friendship and encounter immunization than random immunization. Interestingly, encounter
immunization results in an almost null average final infection rate for immunization rate b = 10%,
and the same is obtained in the case of friend immunization for immunization rate b = 15%.
This highlights the effectiveness of friend immunization, which is able to obtain the same effect
as encounter immunization at a small additional cost.
Figure 19 and 20 show (for immunization rate of b = 5% and b = 10%, respectively)
the fraction of infections with final rate (rR(b, si), rF(b, si), rE(b, si)) above given targets as a
function of the infection start time t0(si), for all immunization methods (random immunization:
red squares, encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green triangles). Each
subplot considers a fixed target value of the final infection rate and, for each immunization
method, plots the fraction of infections that hit that target. As in the other figures, both friend
and encounter immunization provide substantial improvement over random immunization, widely
reducing the fraction of infections that hit the targets. The improvement obtained with encounter
immunization is larger than that obtained with friend immunization.
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Fig. 17. Fraction of infections above 1% final infection rate as a function of immunization rate and immunization method
(random immunization: red squares, encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green triangles). The x-axis
shows the immunization rate b (the fraction of immune individuals). The y-axis shows the fraction of infections above the 1%
target (5000 simulations for each immunization method and value of b).
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Fig. 18. Average final infection rate over infections that do not die out (i.e., final infection rate above 0.1%) as a function of
the infection start time t0(si), for all immunization methods (random immunization: red squares, encounter immunization: blue
circles, friend immunization: green triangles) and immunization rates b (subplots) The x-axis shows t0(si). The y-axis shows
average final infection rate. Bars represent standard errors.
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Fig. 19. Fraction of infections whose final rate is above given targets as a function of the infection start time t0(si), for all
immunization methods (random immunization: red squares, encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green tri-
angles) and immunization rate b = 5%. Subplots consider targets of rR(b, si), rF(b, si), rE(b, si) ∈ {1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, }.
The x-axis shows t0(si). The y-axis shows fraction of infection above the considered targets.
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Fig. 20. Fraction of infections whose final rate is above given targets as a function of the infection start time t0(si), for all immu-
nization methods (random immunization: red squares, encounter immunization: blue circles, friend immunization: green triangles)
and immunization rate b = 10%. Subplots consider targets of rR(b, si), rF(b, si), rE(b, si) ∈ {1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, }. The
x-axis shows t0(si). The y-axis shows fraction of infection above the considered targets.
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X. Epidemics at the macroscopic level: time-varying networks
In this section and in Section XI, we look at the epidemic processes on the different networks
from a macroscopic point of view. Rather than comparing the sets of individuals at risk according
to the two spreading models (i.e., friendship and encounter). we focus on quantities such as the
size of the infected population and the infection detection time. We also consider infection
detection time through sensors, as defined in Section III-C.
Our simulations confirm the idea that the dynamics on different networks present similarities.
Both on static and time-varying networks, the fraction of infected nodes increases linearly over
time after an initial period of incubation, during which the infected population is small. In the
case of time-varying networks (where the infection process runs for a finite number of time steps),
we find an inverse relationship between the infection starting time and the final rate of infection,
showing that earlier connectivity results in faster infection. Final infection rates are higher on
the friendship network, due to it larger density. However, infection rates evolve similarly on
the two networks. If we consider the probability that an infection hits a target α-fraction of
the population, some targets are never reached on the encounter network while they are on the
friendship network (due to the different density), but the trends are similar on both networks. In
the case of static networks (where the infection runs until the entire population is infected), the
time to infect a target α-fraction of the nodes is smaller for seeds with larger degree, confirming
that higher connectivity results in faster infection. Even if the infection spreads faster on the
friendship network, we observe similar trends on both networks.
In this section, we consider SI processes on the time-varying networks {NF(t)}t∈T and {NE(t)}t∈T .
In Section XI, we consider SI processes on the static networks NF = (U, F) and NE = (U, E).
A. Infection Rate
With β = 1, we perform 10, 000 simulations on each time-varying network. In each simulation,
a single seed is selected uniformly at random between all nodes s such that t0({s}) ≤ 500 on the
considered network. That is, in the case of the friendship (respectively, encounter) network, we
consider potential seeds that have an edge in NF(t) (respectively, NE(t)) for some t ≤ 500. As
infections on time-varying networks spread for a limited number of time steps, we require them
to start early enough.
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Each simulation i is therefore associated to a seed si and, as β = 1, the first time in which a
node other than si is infected is
t0(si) = min{t : ∃(si, v) ∈ E(t) for some v , si} ∈ [1, 500],
We refer to t0(si) as the starting time of the infection. Let tF(si) be the last time in which a node
is infected in an infection starting from si (i.e., the time after which the size of the infected
population stops increasing). It holds that tF(si) ≤ max T . At time tF(si), the infection reaches
its peak, infecting a fraction r(si) ∈ [0, 1] of the population.
The final infection r(si) decreases with increasing infection starting time t0(si), for both the
time-varying friendship network (OLS, coefficient −4.255·10−4, p-value< 2·10−16, intercept 0.451,
p-value< 2 ·10−16) and the encounter network (OLS, coefficient −3.922 ·10−4, p-value< 2 ·10−16,
intercept 0.757, p-value< 2 · 10−16). Instead, t0(si) does not predict tF(si) for either the time-
varying friendship network (OLS, coefficient −0.03701, p-value 0.376) or the encounter network
(OLS, coefficient −0.03662, p-value 0.381). This suggests that the networks remain connected
over time and therefore infections that start earlier do not stop earlier.
Due to higher connectivity, the final rate of infection r(si) is on average 31.5% higher on the
time-varying friendship network than on the encounter network (OLS, 0.3149, p-value< 2 ·10−16,
when controlling for t0(si)), see Figure 21 (right panel). Also, the time tF(si) of maximum
infection is reached on average 79 time steps later on the time-varying friendship network than
on encounter network (OLS, 79.19, p-value< 2 ·10−16, when controlling for t0(si)), see Figure 21
(left panel).
The fraction of infected nodes increases linearly over time in both networks (see Figure 22). In
particular, we consider all infections that infected at least 1% of the total population (7, 888 out of
10, 000 simulations in the encounter network, and 9, 100 in the time-varying friendship network).
The infection spreads faster in the time-varying friendship network (OLS, slope 0.06209, p-
value< 2 · 10−16) than in the encounter network (OLS, slope 0.03187, p-value< 2 · 10−16), with
a significantly different slope difference (OLS, interaction coefficient of 7.57 · 10−3, p-value<
2 · 10−16). Moreover, even if an infection starts at time t ≤ 500, it still might take a while to
infect a significant amount of the population (see Figure 22). There is, therefore, a period of
“incubation” during which the fraction of the infected population remains very low.
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Fig. 21. SI process on the time-varying friendship network (white circles) and encounter network (grey circles), β = 1 (certain
infection). 10, 000 simulations are run on each network, each with a single seed si selected at random among all nodes such that
t0(si) ≤ 500. The x-axis represents the infection start time t0(si), rounded to the lower multiple of 10. Point size is proportional
to the number of observations for the corresponding value of the x-axis. Left: Average of the last time of infection tF(si) (i.e.,
the time at which the peak of the infection is reached) with respect to t0(si), for both the friendship and encounter networks.
Right: Average of the final infection r(si) with respect to t0(si), for both the friendship and encounters networks.
B. Sensor monitoring
Instead of monitoring the entire population, in each run of the SI process, we consider a
random set of sensors composed by 1% of the population. Sensors are selected in the two ways
described above: random sensors and friend sensors (where the selection is based on friendship
rather than encounter, even when considering a process spreading on the encounter network). We
perform 10, 000 simulations on each time-varying network and each sensor type, setting β = 1
(i.e., infection is certain). In each simulation, a single seed is selected uniformly at random
between all nodes si such that t0(si) ≤ 500.
Let rS (si) denote the final infection rate of the sensors (considered instead of r(si), defined for
the entire node set). Also rS (si) linearly decreases with increasing infection start time (Figure 23,
left). On average, friend sensors predict an infection rate 9.5% higher than random sensors (OLS,
coefficient 0.0953, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time t0(si) and type of
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Fig. 22. Fraction of infected nodes over time, for the time-varying friendship network (left) and the encounter network (right).
Each SI process (with β = 1) is started from a single seed si selected at random among all nodes such that t0(si) ≤ 500. For
each network, 60 simulations that infected at least 1% of the population are considered. Colors are not meaningful.
network). As random sensor constitute a random sample of the population, their infection reflects
the infection of the entire population. Instead, friends sensors are more connected that average
nodes (the friend paradox) and therefore their larger infection constitutes an overestimation of
the infection of the population. Such overestimation can be beneficial for early detection of an
outbreak. The overestimation effect is larger on the encounter network (OLS, coefficient 0.1197,
p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time) than on the time-varying friendship
network (OLS, coefficient 0.0709e, p-value< 2 · 10−16, when controlling for infection starting
time). However, the sensor type does not significantly affect the slope of the observed linear
decrease (OLS: interaction between infection starting time and sensor type, 2.299 · 10−5, p-value
0.21). We also observe that, on the time-varying friendship network, the rS (si) is on average 29%
higher than on the encounter network (OLS, coefficient −0.2935, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling
for infection starting time and type of network). This effect is larger for random sensors (OLS,
coefficient 0.2809, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time) than for friend
sensors (OLS, coefficient 0.2130, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time).
When restricting our attention to simulations which infected at least 10% of the sensors (on
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the encounter network, 7, 669 with random sensors, 7, 781 with friend sensors, on the friendship
network, 9, 140 with random sensors, 9, 109 with friend sensors), on average, the 10% infection
of friends sensors is reached 128 time units earlier than the 10% infection of random sensors
(OLS, coefficient −128.0, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time and type
of network). For the same consideration as above, friend sensors offer earlier detection with
respect to the 10% infection of the entire population. This underestimation effect is larger on the
encounter network (OLS, coefficient −197.3, p-value< 2 ·10−16, controlling for infection starting
time) than on the time-varying friendship network (OLS, coefficient −69.2, p-value< 2 · 10−16,
controlling for infection starting time). Also in this case, the sensor type does not affect the
slope of the observed linear increase (OLS: interaction between infection starting time and
sensor type, −2.302 · 10−3, p-value 0.892). We also observe that, on the time-varying friendship
network, the infection of 10% of the sensors requires on average 302 units of time less than
on the encounter network (OLS, coefficient −302.6, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection
starting time and type of sensors). This effect is larger for random sensors (OLS, coefficient
−3.672, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time) than friend sensors (OLS,
coefficient −2.384, p-value< 2 · 10−16, controlling for infection starting time).
Figure 24 plots the fraction of simulations that reached a target sensors’ infection versus the
infection starting time (values of the target: 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 80%, 85%). We refer to the
infections that reached a given target as successful (for the given target). For targets of 10%
and 20% (top plots) the observations are the same as above. For a target of 50% (middle left
plot), on the encounter network (circles), the fraction of successful infection decreases more
steeply for random sensors (grey) than friend sensors (white). with the former, the fraction of
successful infections approaches zero for infection starting time above t = 350. This effect is not
observed in the case of the time-varying friendship network (triangles) for target of 50%. For a
target of 75% (middle right plot), we observe a similar effect also on the time-varying friendship
network, on which the success rate decreases faster with random sensors (approaching zero for
infection starting times above t = 400). On the encounter network, there is no successful infection
of random sensors, whereas some successful infection of friends sensors happens for infection
starting time before t = 100. For targets of 80% and 85% (bottom plots), the observations are
similar.
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Fig. 23. Infection detection with random sensors and friend sensors on the friendship and encounter time-varying networks.
10, 000 simulations, with β = 1, are run on each network and for each sensor type. Each simulation starts with a seed si selected
at random among all nodes such that t0(si) ≤ 500. Sensor size is 1% of the population. The x-axis represents the infection start
time t0(si), rounded to the lower multiple of 10. Point size proportional to the number of observations for the corresponding value
of the x-axis. Left: average final sensor infection versus infection start time, for the time-varying friendship network (triangles)
and the encounter network (circles), with random sensors (grey) and friend sensors (white). Right: average time to infect 10%
of the sensors versus infection start time, considering only the simulations in which at least 10% of the sensors are infected.
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Fig. 24. Fraction of simulations that reached a target sensors’ infection versus the infection starting time, for different targets,
for the encounter (circles) and time-varying friendship networks (triangles), using random sensors (grey) and friend sensors
(white). 10, 000 simulations, with β = 1, are run on each network and for each sensor type. Each simulation starts with a seed
si selected at random among all nodes such that t0(si) ≤ 500. Sensor size is 1% of the population. The x-axis represents the
infection start time t0(si), rounded to the lower multiple of 10. Point size proportional to the number of observations for the
corresponding value of the x-axis.
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XI. Epidemics at the macroscopic level: static networks
In this section, we consider SI processes on the static networks NF = (U, F) and NE = (U, E),
started from a single seed, I(0) = {s}. As mentioned in Section II, we consider the giant
components of these networks, consisting in nF = 168, 923 nodes in the friendship network and
nE = 113, 187 nodes in the static encounter network (their union has cardinality nU = 210, 899).
A. Infection Rate
We perform 5, 000 simulations on each static network, setting β = 0.01. In each simulation, a
single seed si is selected uniformly at random between all nodes in the corresponding network.
Given that in a SI process nodes never recover from infection, the entire population eventually
becomes infected for each β > 0 and for each seed si. Recall that, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, τ(α) represents
the first time in which a α-fraction of the population is infected (for ease of notation, we omit
the dependency on si). In this section, we study how the infection grows over time, that is, how
τ(α) grows with α.
Figure 25 relates the degree of the infection seed (i.e., encounter and friend degree) to the
time τ(α) to reach infection targets of α ∈ {0.5%, 1%, 5%, 10%}. Top and bottom panels consider
the SI process on the static encounter network and the friendship network, respectively. The
x-axis show either the encounter degree (left panels) or the friend degree (right panels) of the
seed (with degree at most 25).
In general, for all targets α ∈ {0.5%, 1%, 5%, 10%}, increasing encounter (reps. friendship)
degree is related to an initial steep decrease in the infection time on the encounter (reps.
friendship) network, that then smooths out when the degree surpasses a threshold.
In the static encounter network (compare Figure 25, top-left panel), encounter degree larger
than 10 results in a four-fold decrease of the infection time with respect to degree one, for all
values of α (two-sample t-tests, means 188 and 42 for α = 0.5%, 191 and 45 for α = 1%, 201
and 55 for α = 5%, 209 and 62 for α = 10%, p-value< 2.2 · 10−16 for all α). The decrease of
the infection time with respect to seed degree is slow for degree larger than 15 (OLS, restricted
to seeds with encounter degree larger than 15, degree coefficient −0.300 for all α, p-value<
5.57e − 11). The effect of the seed’s friend degree on the infection speed on the encounter
network is limited (degree coefficient −0.14 for all α, p-value< 2.48e − 8; compare Figure 25,
top-right panel).
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In the friendship network (compare Figure 25, bottom-right panel), friend degree larger than
5 results in a six-fold decrease of the infection time with respect to degree one, for all values
of α (two-sample t-tests, means 134.97 and 20.63 for α = 0.5%, 135.60 and 21.23 for α = 1%,
137.48 and 23.11 for α = 5%, 139.37 and 25.01 for α = 10%, p-value< 2.2 · 10−16 for all α).
The decrease of the infection time is slow for degree larger than 10 (OLS, restricted to seed
with encounter degree larger than 10, degree coefficient −0.0547 for all α, p-value< 9.63e−14).
Larger encounter degree is not related to an equally steep decrease of the infection speed on
the friendship network (compare Figure 25, bottom-left panel), despite its effect is somewhat
(degree coefficient −1.270 for all α, p-value< 2.08e−7), likely due to the low average encounter
degree (mean 2.594).
If we look at how the infection grows over time, we observe an initial “incubation” period,
during which the infected population is very small, followed by an explosion of the infection.
Figure 25 plots the percentage of the infected population over time (up to 25%) for a sample
of 60 randomly selected seeds on the encounter (right panel) network and 60 randomly selected
seeds on the friendship network (left panel). Overall, on the friendship network, an infection
starting from a single seed takes on average 59.44 time units to infect an initial 0.01% of
the population (about 17 nodes), with more connected nodes requiring less time (OLS, degree
coefficient −0.273, p-value< 2.2 · 10−16). On the static encounter network, an infection starting
from a single seed takes on average 107.78 time units to infect an initial 0.01% of the population
(about 12 nodes), with more connected nodes requiring less time (OLS, degree coefficient −3.384,
p-value< 2.2 · 10−16).
The incubation period is in large part determined by the time required by the seed to infect its
first neighbor (and thus depends on the infection rate β). Indeed, the first infection happens, on
average, after 39.68 time units in the friendship network (decreasing with degree, OLS, −0.1608,
p-value 4.46e − 11), and after 53.07 time units in the static encounter network (decreasing with
degree, OLS, −2.011, p-value < 2 · 10−16).
B. Sensor Monitoring
Instead of monitoring the entire population, in each run of the SI process, we consider a
random set of sensors composed by 1% of the population. Sensors are selected in the two ways
described above: random sensors and friend sensors (where the selection is based on friendship
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Fig. 25. Infection speed versus degree - static networks. The plots relate the encounter and friendship degree of a seed
node with the infection speed for different target infections α. 5000 simulations with β = 0.01 are run per network, selecting a
seed uniformly at random for each simulation. The left panels relate encounter degree of the seed with infection on the static
encounter network (top) and friendship network (bottom), for degree of at most 25. The right panels relate friends degree of
the seed with infection on the static encounter network (top) and friendship network (bottom), for degree of at most 25. Point
size are proportional to the logarithm of the number of observations for each degree.
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Fig. 26. Growth of the infection over time - static networks. 60 simulations with β = 0.01 are shown for the friendship
network (left) and for the static encounter network (right). For each simulation, a seed is selected uniform at random and the
infection starts at time t = 0. Colors are not meaningful. An initial “incubation” period, during which the infection spreads from
the seed to its first neighbors, is followed by an explosion of the infection.
rather than encounter, even when considering a process spreading on the encounter network).
We perform 5, 000 simulations on each static network and each sensor type, setting β = 0.01
(stochastic infection). In each simulation, a single seed is selected uniformly at random between
all nodes in the network.
Figure 27 plots the average time to detect a 5% infection of the sensors versus the seed degree,
on the static encounter network (top panels) and friendship network (bottom panels). The x-axis
shows either the encounter degree (left panels) or the friend degree (right panels) of the seed
(degree at most 25).
On the static encounter network (compare Figure 27, top panels), friends sensors guarantee
earlier detection than random sensors. The average detection time is smaller with friend sensors
than with random sensors, both for a 5% infection (135.36 times units versus 141.66, t-test,
p-value 0.00487), a 10% infection (139.96 time units versus 149.13, t-test, p-value 4.109 · 10−5),
and a 25% infection (151.17 time units versus 168.51, t-test, p-value 9.913e − 15). The earlier
detection provided by friend sensors over random sensors is not statistically significant for targets
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of 0.05% and 1% infection.
On the friendship network (compare Figure 27, bottom panels), despite friend sensors provide
a lower average detection time than random sensors, the difference is not statistically significant
for any target infection rate.
The results above are driven by the stochastic incubation time needed to get the infection
started, driven by the parameter β, as we observed in the previous section. In order to control
for such randomness, we perform 5, 000 additional simulations for each time-varying network
and sensor type, setting β = 1 (certain infection). This choice allows to study the effect of
the structural properties of the selected sensors on the infection detection time. Friend sensors
provide faster detection of the infection both on the friendship and the encounter network, and
for all targets α.
Figure 28 plots the average time to detect a 25% infection of the sensors versus the seed
degree, on the static encounter network (top panels) and friendship network (bottom panels).
The x-axis shows either the encounter degree (left panels) or the friend degree (right panels)
of the seed (degree at most 25). On the encounter network (compare Figure 28, top panels),
the average detection time for a 0.5% infection of friends sensors is 3.3516 time units (versus
3.7426 for random sensors), for a 1% infection is 3.5488 (versus 3.9894), for a 5% infection
is 4.1192 (versus 4.5660), for a 10% infection is 4.4008 (versus 4.8526), for a 25% infection
is 4.8922 (versus 5.3340), and all value are statistically significant (t-tests, p-values< 2 · 10−16).
On the friendship network (compare Figure 28, bottom panels), the average detection time for
a 0.5% infection of friends sensors is 3.3516 time units (versus 3.7426 for random sensors), for
a 1% infection is 2.4748 (versus 2.8432), for a 5% infection is 2.6004 (versus 2.9804), for a
10% infection is 2.9286 (versus 3.6092), for a 25% infection is 3.5142 (versus 3.9056), and all
value are statistically significant (t-tests, p-values< 2 · 10−16).
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Fig. 27. Sensor infection monitoring versus seed degree - static networks. The plots show the average time to infect 5%
of the sensors versus the degree of the infection seed. 5000 simulations with β = 0.01 are run per network and per sensor type.
For each simulation, a seed is selected uniformly at random, and the sensor size is 1% of the total population. The left panels
relate encounter degree of the seed with infection on the static encounter network (top) and friendship network (bottom), for
degree of at most 25. The right panels relate friends degree of the seed with infection on the static encounter network (top) and
friendship network (bottom), for degree of at most 25. Point size are proportional to the logarithm of the number of observations
for each degree.
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Fig. 28. Sensor infection monitoring versus seed degree - static networks. The plots show the average time to infect 25%
of the sensors versus the degree of the infection seed. 5000 simulations with β = 1 (certain infection) are run per network and
per sensor type. For each simulation, a seed is selected uniformly at random, and the sensor size is 1% of the total population.
The left panels relate encounter degree of the seed with infection on the static encounter network (top) and friendship network
(bottom), for degree of at most 25. The right panels relate friends degree of the seed with infection on the static encounter
network (top) and friendship network (bottom), for degree of at most 25. Point size are proportional to the logarithm of the
number of observations for each degree.
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XII. Discussion
This paper started from the observations that physical encounter is the most common vehicle
for the spread of infectious diseases, but pervasive and detailed information about said encounters
is often unavailable. Therefore, given an infection driven by physical encounter, we explored
the question of whether friendship ties successfully predict the individuals at risk. Through
computer simulation, we argued that this is not the case: friendship networks do not provide
accurate prediction of epidemic risk. In particular, building a friendship network and an encounter
network between the same set of individuals, we showed that epidemic processes initiated at the
same seed but spreading independently on the two networks infect very different sets of nodes,
even after controlling for the fact that individuals might be connected in one network and not in
the other. The difference is not determined by the randomness of the infection process, but by the
differences in local connectivity between the two networks. Also, the difference is not determined
by the static nature of the friendship network, whose edges do not change over time, as opposed
to the time-varying nature of the encounter network, whose edges are activated when individuals
encounter. Our analyses reveal a striking contrast between the similarity at the macroscopic level
of processes spreading on different networks (confirmed by our simulations) and the possibly
misleading prediction of risk resulting from the chosen definition of edges. However, despite the
limits highlighted by our analyses, we show that periodical and relatively infrequent monitoring
of the real infection on the encounter network allows to correct the predicted infection on the
friendship network and to achieve satisfactory prediction accuracy. In this sense, the ability
to periodically monitor the infection on the encounter network is the key to overcome the
limits of the friendship network in predicting epidemic risk. In addition, the friendship network
allows to effectively employ a given immunization budget (e.g., limited vaccine amount) for the
containment of epidemic outbreaks. A simple strategy that gives immunization to random friends
of randomly chosen individuals substantially increases the probability that an infection dies out
in its early stage and strongly reduces the expected final infection size with respect to purely
random immunization.
When it is known who is infected or likely to become infected (e.g., individuals traveling
to certain countries who might have come in contact with a pathogen), accurate prediction of
the individuals at risk of contagion would allow targeted monitoring and immunization. Despite
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friendship and other social relationships might be informative about the encounters between
individuals, our work suggests that they do not always give a complete picture of the paths a
pathogen might take. Information about future encounters between individuals is likely to be
unavailable, at least at a detailed level. However, a feasible approach could use past encounter
as a proxy of future encounter. In fact, it is known that human mobility and encounter present
high spatial and temporal regularity and predictability [13], [37], [84], [88]. From a practical
perspective, networks based on social relationships might be complemented by information about
past encounter. Our simulations are based on a dataset that allowed us to build a static friendship
network and a time-varying encounter network that is a candidate vehicle for the spread of a
pathogen. The dataset considers a large number of individuals and spans several years of activity.
In general, other datasets might be available and allow similar analyses. Friendship networks
whose edges have a different semantic than that considered in the present work might lead to
different observations.
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